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Abstract: 
Scientific literature is concerned with the impact that climate change will have on 
natural disasters in the near future. These events disrupt our daily lives and can cause damage 
that may never be repaired. Merging science and social science, the study of vulnerability looks 
at how human systems will be impacted by these natural disasters. In the United States, 
hurricanes in the Gulf Coast are projected to increase in intensity as well as have an increased 
capacity for damage with a rise in sea level. Therefore, it is important to understand who is 
systematically vulnerable to these impacts of natural disasters and how we can mitigate this 
damage.  
Through this thesis, I argue that these impacts of hurricanes will put already vulnerable 
populations at a greater risk for damage caused by these events in the future. I will briefly 
outline the scientific basis on which the claims of increased hurricane activity are founded, as 
well as outline concepts of vulnerability. I examine case studies of Hurricanes Andrew and 
Katrina, both of which can inform how social disparities delineate vulnerability in the United 
States. Based upon this historical understanding that recovery from a storm is highly contingent 
upon social and economic resources available to an individual or community, I argue that 
vulnerable communities must be highlighted. I then project vulnerability based upon 
demographic characteristics of communities within the Gulf Coast in order to highlight these 
areas of necessary attention.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Natural disasters are almost always events that receive an overwhelming amount of 
media attention, and then fade in urgency from public memory within months of the event. 
Disasters have commonly been recognized as a disruption and extreme experience that has no 
place in daily life. As a result, disasters are seen as something that must be weathered and 
overcome for an attempt to return to a previous state of normalcy. What is left out of view to 
those not directly affected, is the stress residents endure as they must seek information about 
their safety, and hope that the government has adequately prepared to help them with the 
aftermath. They can then be burdened with months or years of recovery as they wade through 
bureaucratic red tape and hope for assistance, or more likely have to rebuild their lives and 
start from scratch. This reality refers largely to individuals without social or economic capital to 
make the problem go away quickly, those who are already vulnerable- based on social 
inequalities of race, class, gender, and age among other social determinants. 
Within the United States, hurricanes regularly threaten the lives and livelihoods of many 
people living on the US Gulf Coast and Atlantic Coast. I have chosen to focus on the US Gulf 
Coast because of the increasing effects hurricanes will have on already vulnerable populations 
due to climate change. Hurricane activity has been linked to climate change as projected storm 
models indicate an increase in the number of high intensity storms in the future. In addition to 
this prediction, the tangible impacts of climate change can be observed in sea level rise, which 
will cause more damage to human settlement in any magnitude of future storm (Bender et al., 
2010). 
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Through my research I explore how vulnerable populations are unequally burdened with 
preparation and recovery efforts beyond their means of resilience. Barriers experienced by 
vulnerable populations at every stage of recovery are imbalanced and often lead to lag-time of 
low-income and minority communities in rebuilding from storms. I begin by examining 
Hurricanes Andrew (1992) and Katrina (2005), which had various impacts on human 
populations due to location, intensity, preparedness, and support among other influencing 
factors. These case studies will help to inform our understanding of the struggles that 
vulnerable populations face and why this critical issue should be addressed. I then identify 
vulnerable populations to future storms to demonstrate that vulnerable populations will be at 
an increased risk with projected changes in hurricane activity. 
I argue that these impacts of hurricanes will put already vulnerable populations at a 
greater risk for damage caused by these events in the future. Based upon this historical 
understanding that recovery from a storm is highly contingent upon social and economic 
resources available to an individual or community, I argue that vulnerable communities must be 
highlighted. I then project vulnerability based upon demographic characteristics of 
communities within the Gulf Coast in order to highlight these areas of necessary attention. It is 
imperative that we spark a discussion that illuminates this issue facing vulnerable populations 
so that we can move forward to assist these populations before they see these projected 
effects.  
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CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Disasters: The Dominant Paradigm 
 Until recently, scholars accepted a view of disasters as simply a battle between man and 
nature. As such, disaster studies belonged to a more scientific field of understanding Earth’s 
systems. Since they have been seen as being a simple problem, the field focused intently on the 
idea that technological fixes were the right solution (Mileti, 1999). This paradigm allows us to 
point the blame at the disaster and wash our hands of social structure that created risk for the 
poor (Dyson, 2006). In the 1970s, joint research between sociologists and scientists began to 
emerge which set the stage for contextualizing disasters from a social standpoint (Mileti, 1999; 
Scandlyn, Thomas, & Brett, 2013).   
Now, we understand that disasters are not just random events, but rather the impact of 
a natural event on a dynamic human population. Human adjustment to disaster takes place in 
four steps: preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation (Mileti, 1999). In this respect, 
scholars are beginning to view disasters as a distinct event that exemplifies the purest form of 
pre-existing social conditions in an area. With the changed conceptualization of disasters, the 
study of vulnerability has emerged in the past few decades (Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon, & Davis, 
2004). 
Intersecting Risk and Hazard 
 
 Disasters happen at the intersection of risk and hazard, that is social vulnerability and 
event. One model that explains vulnerability in relation to recovery is called the Pressure and 
Release Model. In this model Pressure is the underlying social vulnerability, deeply rooted in 
social processes and Release is the disaster itself. The Release of a disaster works to actually 
release pent up social pressures. The pressure can also be released through a reduction of 
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vulnerability, which is a difficult process because it requires addressing big societal issues of 
racism and poverty (Wisner et al., 2004). This can also help to explain recovery patterns of 
vulnerability as components of inequality are essentially unpacked through their release in 
disaster. 
Social Vulnerability 
 
         In order to understand exactly what makes a person more likely to face negative effects 
of a certain hazards, it is important to know how scholars measure vulnerability and its effects. 
The type of vulnerability discussed for the purposes of this paper is called social vulnerability. At 
its most basic level, vulnerability is the potential for harm or loss and examines circumstances 
that work to place individuals and localities at risk (Cutter, Burton, & Emrich, 2010). On an 
individual level, social vulnerability  is a measure of a person’s ability, or lack thereof, to cope 
with and recover from external stress placed on their livelihood( Cutter, Boruff, & Shirley, 2003; 
Cutter et al., 2010). On a community level, it can refer to broader existing infrastructure and 
how it is aggravated by outside forces (Adger & Kelly, 1999).  It is a measure that is deeply 
rooted in the historical context that informs social structures of a population, and therefore can 
be a highly localized phenomenon (Bolin, 2007; Cutter & Finch, 2008; Fordham, Lovecamp, 
Thomas, & Phillips, 2013; Scandlyn et al., 2013). As the name suggests, social vulnerability is a 
highly social idea, derived from inequalities in the framework of society along lines of race, 
ethnicity and class in addition to gender, age, disability status, and many more identifiers of an 
individual. It does not stem from the misunderstanding of risk, but “is the failure of society to 
recognize that a condition, such as poverty, means you cannot necessarily mitigate risk, live in a 
safer location, or afford to evacuate when told to do so” (Fordham et al., 2013, p. 12). Thus, 
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many individuals and communities are socially vulnerable as a result of structural inequalities 
that disfavor minorities and those of lower socioeconomic status as well as other ascribed and 
attained characteristics. Social vulnerability exists within society at all points in time, and must 
be acknowledged by government and aid communities prior to onset of a disaster. Although it 
exists at all points in time, it is also important to remember that it is a spatially and temporally 
dynamic process (Mileti, 1999; Wisner et al., 2004). It is important to note that social 
vulnerability is largely tied to lack of resources- both economic and social- and as such, people 
usually understand their position but cannot act on pre-existing knowledge to prepare for 
disaster (Scandlyn et al., 2013). 
Social vulnerability can be broadly broken down into four categories: socioeconomic 
status, race, age, and gender (Cutter et al., 2003; Wisner et al., 2004). These components of an 
individual’s life can be measured through proxy data in order to indicate correlation to risk. 
Proxy data can be measured through census data, for example socioeconomic status can be 
measured by annual income, educational attainment, renter status, number of individuals in 
household, etcetera. These categories are not necessarily in place to separate components of 
vulnerability, but rather to inform how we are able to measure this risk. They interact with each 
other to provide a holistic understanding of vulnerability( Wisner et al., 2004). 
Social vulnerability is related to a person’s capital and access to capital in order to 
prepare for, stay safe during, and recover from disasters and can therefore be measured 
through class. While it is true that the rich have more financial damage to property in the face 
of disaster, it is important to note that in terms of relative wealth the poor come out behind 
(Scandlyn et al., 2013; Wisner et al., 2004). This puts people at greater risk in face of a disaster 
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as poor quality housing is heavily damaged, and in its aftermath as they receive limited 
amounts of money to rebuild (R. Bullard & Wright, 2009b; McCoy & Dash, 2013; Mileti, 1999; 
Scandlyn et al., 2013). Loans available to the low-income are often unrealistic to repay, 
reinforcing existing social power structures or domination (Wisner et al., 2004).  In addition to 
having more household income and assets to draw from, high-income households are also 
more likely to receive both private and federal assistance in the face of disaster, reducing their 
future vulnerability to similar events (Peacock & Ragsdale, 1997; Wisner et al., 2004). In the 
United States, there is large income stratification, leaving many with low income in powerless 
positions. In disasters, wealth directly relates to ability to cope and recover because wealth 
denotes a certain level of power. This system of wealth and power distribution is in place 
before a disaster strikes and affects all stages of the hazard(Wisner et al., 2004). This power 
comes in the form of available credit, monetary assets, flexibility in evacuation and returning, 
and large social networks (McCoy & Dash, 2013).  
Class plays a large role in vulnerability because it measures people’s personal ability as 
well as resources available to them to cope with disaster (McCoy & Dash, 2013). Social 
vulnerability from the community perspective can also be related to class, although there is no 
direct link between socioeconomic status the presence of wealth can help a community. 
Wealth denotes a larger tax base, and thus more money available to a community but more 
importantly it denotes political power. Communities that tend to be better organized, with 
elected officials representing the interests of their constituents are able to use this power to 
gain resources in a disaster setting.  
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Race and ethnicity are another aspect of vulnerability because they come with an 
ascribed status in US society. Social conditions that ascribe a hierarchy tend to marginalize 
minorities in many respects, including barriers from attaining certain status of class and wealth. 
Minority individuals tend to have a lower income, and face more discrimination limiting their 
ability to attain resources (Morrow, 1997a).  It is for this reason that vulnerable communities 
are largely minority status(Dash, 2013). In the face of disaster, these variables, such as 
socioeconomic status and racial inequality take on added significance proliferating vulnerability 
and its effects (Mileti, 1999; Peacock & Ragsdale, 1997).  
Vulnerability also means that it is hardest to reconstruct livelihoods after disaster. Those 
who prove to be of marginally importance to decision makers are those who are already 
economically and environmentally marginal. This affects distribution of resources and the 
perceived ability of vulnerable populations to affect themselves (Wisner et al., 2004). Thus, 
vulnerability can explain barriers in stages from preparation for a disaster all the way through 
recovery. 
Resilience 
 
 Resilience is a term that is often discussed in this body of literature. While it is not the 
primary focus of this paper, it is an important term to define because of it is often used as a 
measuring tool for preparedness and recovery. A standard understanding of resilience is related 
to ability to withstand disaster, which is how mitigation attempts and government agencies 
tend to utilize it (Cutter et al., 2010). In a more holistic understanding, it refers to the ability of 
an individual or community to prepare for and successfully rebuild after a natural disaster 
(Jenkins, 2013; Scandlyn et al., 2013). The slight difference in these two definitions is a result of 
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a focus, or lack thereof, on the understanding of the social context in which preparation, 
disasters themselves, and recovery occur. Resilience is an important measure for social 
vulnerability because it allows us to analyze the aftermath of a disaster (Cutter et al., 2013, 
2010; J. Liu, 2010; Posey, 2009; Tobin, 1999). It can provide the climate for economic 
opportunity, community strengthening, and increasing communication after a disaster, which in 
turn assists in preparation for future events. This analysis allows for an hopeful outlook on 
recovery, allowing an area to find success in the aftermath of an event(Cutter et al., 2010; 
Jenkins, 2013; J. Liu, 2010; Squires & Hartman, 2006). Optimistically speaking on resilience Liu 
asserts, “if a place norm is undesirable, disaster can create opportunity for a different future” 
(A. Liu, Anglin, Mizelle, & Plyer, 2011, p. 24). 
Measuring Vulnerability in the United States 
 
         One of the most prominent scholars in this field, Cutter, developed an index called the 
Social Vulnerability Index (SoVI), which utilizes a statistical method to analyze vulnerability, by 
coding relevant demographic to map social vulnerability within the United States (Cutter et al., 
2003). Through this mapping tool, it is relatively easy to visualize relative vulnerability of 
populations across the country, and the tool has been utilized in analysis by many authors since 
its development (Cutter et al., 2013; Schmidtlein, Deutsch, Piegorsch, & Cutter, 2008). 
The SoVI was utilized to complete a temporal-spatial analysis of vulnerability and 
determine that within the United States, there has been a large change in variability of 
vulnerable populations (Cutter & Finch, 2008). More specifically, the analysis indicates that 
between 1960 and 2000 there has been a shift from extreme to smaller concentrations of 
vulnerable populations over time, which informs our efforts at disaster mitigation to emphasize 
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the importance of place-based modeling of disaster analysis. They observed that counties with 
dramatic change in vulnerability are often due to extreme influx or exodus of populations, 
indicating that the demographic makeup of community is indeed strongly correlated to 
vulnerability. Components of this analysis can be utilized to confirm social-based theories of 
vulnerability including her conclusions that areas of high vulnerability are associated with urban 
development, low socioeconomic status and race. In stark contrast, areas with low vulnerability 
are majority white, and young population (Cutter & Finch, 2008). 
Logan and Xu completed a similar temporal analysis of vulnerability in 2015 with a more 
specific focus on hurricanes in the Gulf Coast. They determined that risk to hurricane damage 
has changed in this region temporally because certain groups are able to minimize their 
damage by making themselves indifferent to it. Indifference can be accomplished by moving 
out of dangerous areas, or building up social capital so that insurance and money are available 
for rebuilding efforts.  This theory of indifference is corroborated by other scholars, that there 
is an element of choice associated with wealth and desirable location which is part of the 
opportunity of some to “self-protect” from damage (V. K. Smith, Carbone, Pope, Hallstrom, & 
Darden, 2006; Wisner et al., 2004). These patterns showed a clear distinction between blacks 
and whites, as vulnerability of blacks increased from 1950 to 2000 and then dramatically 
decreased between 2000 and 2010. This indicates the effects of massive storms Katrina and 
Rita in this region led to a change in population distribution rather than direct vulnerability 
(Logan & Xu, 2015). This analysis of vulnerability composition is an important piece of literature 
that has captured temporal dynamics of vulnerability within the United States. 
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Due to the intersection of physical and social environments that create impacts of 
disasters, it is important to understand these underlying social factors related to an individual’s 
ability to address the stress of a natural event. Therefore, it is important that we understand not 
only how it is conceptualized, but also how it is measured by scholars. With this contextual 
understanding of vulnerability, we can examine impacts of specific natural events and draw 
connections between vulnerability and these impacts. While vulnerability is important to 
understand from a theoretical standpoint, it is often difficult to see how it will affect a given 
community without a retrospective analysis of a specific event (Mileti, 1999). I will utilize this 
framework of social vulnerability to understand impacts of Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina in the 
Gulf Coast, as well as to project future vulnerabilities.  
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Chapter 2: Scientific Background 
 
 Hurricanes affect the United States in the Gulf of Mexico, which touches the states of 
Texas, Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, and Florida. They cause great damage to coastal 
settlements as well as areas of wind damage where the storm makes landfall. Within the 
dynamics of global climate change, hurricanes are projected to see shifting patterns and thus 
their impacts on human settlement will also change in decades to come. In addition to changing 
patterns of hurricanes, a global sea level rise will lead to greater impacts of storms on coastal 
communities. Although the science of climate change, in particular with respect to hurricanes, 
is an ongoing process it is important to highlight how and where these changes are occurring if 
we are to address the risk that human society poses based upon coastal settlement patterns.  
Hurricanes 
 
 Hurricanes are one regional name for what is broadly called cyclonic storms in the 
scientific community, and the two may be used interchangeably for the purposes of this 
paper(Webster, Holland, Curry, & Chang, 2005). Hurricane impacts generally take two forms, 
wind speed and storm surge both of which have varying degrees of impact on human 
communities. Hurricanes are measured on the Saffir-Simpson Scale, which is where the 
Category 1-5 rating system that most people are familiar with comes from. This scale measures 
wind speed of hurricanes, with those placed in category three to five being considered 
dangerous to human settlements(National Hurricane Center, n.d.-a). Storm surge is the rise of 
water generated by a storm that is not associated with normal tidal processes. It is produced by 
wind activity of a hurricane pushing onto the water, and usually results in extreme flooding in 
coastal areas(National Hurricane Center, n.d.-b; National Hurricane Center, Storm Surge Unit, 
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n.d.). Many of the most devastating storms have large surges, as the pure weight of the water 
causes extreme damage to property and human life(National Hurricane Center, n.d.-b). Due to 
the fact that storm surge occurs at landfall, it is harder to predict and track than wind speed. 
The effects of storm surge can be great regardless of the category of the storm, for example 
Hurricane Katrina was a category three storm at landfall, but storm surge was close to twenty-
eight feet which was responsible for the flooding of the city(National Hurricane Center, Storm 
Surge Unit, n.d.). Information on storm surge is reported in units of feet, for the United States 
at least, and prediction measures for storm surge are not as accurate as wind speed measures 
at present(National Hurricane Center, n.d.-c). Within the United States, storm surge is an 
important factor of damage done by a hurricane as most of the Gulf Coast lies less than ten feet 
above mean sea level(National Hurricane Center, n.d.-b). Hurricane damage can be very great 
on the coast because of storm surge, and inland as a result of wind shearing, making them one 
of the costliest natural disasters. Because the majority of human populations, and their 
infrastructure are present near the coastline, hurricanes are an important phenomenon to 
understand and predict.  
Changes to Hurricane Patterns  
 
 One of the many changes to our planet as a result of climate change will be hurricane 
activity(Emanuel, 2008; Emanuel, Sundararajan, & Williams, 2008; Geophysical Fluid Dynamics 
Laboratory/NOAA, 2015). Because it is a process generated in the atmosphere and ocean, 
cyclonic events are bound to see changes in their patterns as a result of the multitude of the 
ways effects of climate change exist. It is important to understand that projections of changes 
to hurricane activity are highly contingent upon very complicated climate modeling, and as such 
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it is difficult to say with certainty what these effects will be. The International Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) believes with medium confidence that models of extreme events are strong 
(Flato et al. 2013).  In their 2013 Report, the IPCC stated definitively that North Atlantic tropical 
cyclones are more likely than not to see an increase in occurrence of the strongest storms 
(Christensen et al. 2013).  
Some of the uncertainty in these modeling projections comes from the dynamic nature 
of Earth’s systems(Emanuel, 2008; Webster et al., 2005). For example, sea surface temperature 
is related to the formation of storms, and there is a potential that maximum intensity of storm 
events is dictated by sea surface temperature. Other debates on compounding factors revolve 
around the concertation of carbon dioxide and hurricane activity remain heated(Webster et al., 
2005). There is also little historical data regarding hurricanes, with technology pre-1970s being 
unreliable to detect more than storm count, and few events occurring per year making it 
difficult to complete statistical analysis(Emanuel, 2008; Lin, Lane, Emanuel, Sullivan, & 
Donnelly, 2014; Mann & Emanuel, 2006; Walsh et al., 2014). Changes to tropical cyclone 
patterns are also likely to vary by region (Christensen et al. 2013). It is partially because of this 
regional variation that the scientific community remains hesitant to definitively conclude 
patterns of hurricane activity.  
When looking at the United States Gulf Coast, or for hurricane activity the Atlantic 
Ocean, we can see an increase in sea surface temperature that is positively correlated to 
regional hurricane activity. This increase in sea surface temperature is one reason why 
projections over the Atlantic Ocean see an increase in hurricane intensity(Elsner, Kossin, & 
Jagger, 2008; Mann & Emanuel, 2006; Vecchi, Swanson, & Soden, 2008). In their analysis, Mann 
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and Emanuel conclude that this increase in sea surface temperature, as an underlying cause of 
changes to storm patterns, is unrelated to forces of ocean oscillation, indicating that this 
change is unrelated to larger oceanic processes, and therefore is likely a new trend related to 
climate change(Mann & Emanuel, 2006). The connection between sea surface temperature and 
hurricanes is very important in understanding climate change projections related to hurricane 
activity. There has also been a statistically significant increase in observed number of events in 
the North Atlantic in the past thirty years, which can corroborate some results of modeling as 
apparent recent trends emerge(Dwyer et al., 2015; Walsh et al., 2014; Webster et al., 2005).  
Results of modeling programs tend to indicate a decrease in frequency, number of 
storm occurrences, and an increase in intensity of storms(Bender et al., 2010; Emanuel, 2008; 
Emanuel et al., 2008; Knutson et al., 2015; Walsh et al., 2014; Webster et al., 2005). The 
number of category four and five storms almost doubled within this observation window of 
thirty years, which falls in line with these modeled projections(Webster et al., 2005). These 
results are cause for concern as coastal communities are rarely equipped to handle the storms 
of such a high intensity, and effects to human systems will likely increase with these intense 
storms. Any changes in hurricane activity as a result of global climate change will be 
problematic for natural ecosystems and human settlements alike as shocks to the system will 
have unknown consequences.   
Sea Level Rise 
 
The IPCC 2013 report identified sea level rise as being of integral importance to 
understand in respect to climate change, with estimates of being “very likely” that rate of 
global mean sea level rise in the twenty-first century exceeding observed sea level rise in past 
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decades. Rates of almost 2 mm per year were observed during the twentieth century, and will 
continue to increase. This increase is largely related to melting of ice sheets which is 
accelerating with greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere and will likely continue 
even if greenhouse gas concentrations are stabilized (Church et al 2013).  
 In one study, Neumann and his co-authors argue that it is important to consider 
combined effect of sea level rise and storm surge in analyzing risk as they generated modeling 
of effects of storm surge given these new parameters. They found that there will be a dramatic 
increase in economic costs with storms if mitigation and adaptation measures are not taken to 
reduce risk of coastal communities(Neumann et al., 2014). For example, the government of 
Florida is concerned about sea level rise because eighty percent of their economy is coastal, 
and three-quarters of their population live in coastal cities (Florida Oceans and Coastal Council, 
2010). The state’s concern, which resounds throughout human settlements, is that the 
infrastructure in coastal communities is practically fixed. The risk of surge was actually 
measured for a portion of the Florida Gulf Coast, and found that the area is extremely 
susceptible to storm surge and higher magnitude storms will result in greater surge impacts(Lin 
et al., 2014).  
Summary 
 
While climate change modeling and the scientific community are unable to give a 
definitive answer on changes to hurricane activity, these projections in themselves indicate a 
need for action to address environmental changes associated with these storms. The definitive 
increasing patterns of sea level rise are an important component of hurricane activity as storm 
surge itself will be greater in hurricanes. This indicates that regardless of changes to frequency 
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or intensity of hurricanes, coastal communities will face greater impacts of storms as more 
water inundates their communities when hurricanes hit. These damages will interact with 
patterns of vulnerability, both social and locational, in future storm events. It is therefore 
important to understand both social and climate components of the picture to mitigate and 
respond to natural disasters in the future.  
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Chapter 3: Hurricane Andrew 
  
         Hurricane Andrew is important to understand from a vulnerability standpoint because 
of the location of its landfall. The storm’s path devastated poorly constructed housing units, 
and led to delayed recovery of certain community members. It was one of the hardest hitting 
and most expensive storms in the history of the United States, doing almost $25 billion in 
damages (Mileti, 1999). The coastal population of the United States had been increasing by 
nearly 50% every decade. This increase can, in part, explain how difficult the recovery process 
was for survivors of Andrew (Wisner et al., 2004). The hurricane made landfall on August 24, 
1992. Residents were given little warning as it was upgraded from tropical storm to category 5 
hurricane within a period of two days (Morrow, 1997a). It struck a largely unincorporated area 
next to Miami, in Dade County as well as a portion of South Florida. The impacts of the storm 
surge were greater in South Dade, with a survey reporting that 90% of housing units were 
damaged compared to North Dade, which saw around 50% of units damaged(S. K. Smith & 
McCarty, 1996). The area of Dade County was ethnically and racially diverse, with a large 
Hispanic population, including a notably strong Cuban community, as well as many Blacks, both 
African-American and Caribbean blacks. The unique ethnic and racial makeup of areas affected 
by the storm affords us the opportunity to review components of resource availability and the 
effect that political and social capital play on its distribution.  
 Climate of Race Relations prior to Andrew 
 
Prior to the storm, the greater Miami area was known as a city of contrasts and 
extremes with a large proportion of foreign-born and first generation residents. The city was 
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originally founded by whites, locally known as Anglos, in the 1880s. The city remained highly 
Anglo until the Great Depression when its residents could no longer afford to be elite, the 
upper class residents were forced to allow the middle-class into their social clubs and 
neighborhoods. This led to the development of Miami as a popular tourist destination, when 
blacks began to congregate as employees in the service sector. As time passed, there was 
migration of lower-class Anglos away from the city, resulting in a largely upper class Anglo 
population of the area. These were businessmen and entrepreneurs, and were therefore able 
to maintain a degree of political power despite their relatively small proportion of the total 
population(Greiner & Morrow, 1997). Estimates from the 1990 census indicate that Anglos 
made up 30% of the Dade County population prior to Andrew(Morrow, 1997a).  
Post World War II, an increase in Cuban residents occurred, with many seeking refuge 
from the Cuban Revolution and by 1980 half of all Cuban Americans lived in Dade 
County(Greiner & Morrow, 1997). The Hispanic population of Dade County made up half of the 
total Dade County population in 1990, most of whom were Cuban(Morrow, 1997a). The 
majority of the Cuban community were members of small family-owned businesses, which 
looked out for their own. The Hispanic community attained a strong economic and political 
presence within Dade County which allowed them to demand attention for their 
community(Greiner & Morrow, 1997). As a whole, the Hispanic community in the Miami area 
was more concentrated prior to the storm, which benefited them in many was both before and 
after the storm. 
  Blacks in the Miami-Dade area were less concentrated, but saw some patterns of 
segregation as many were concentrated in neighborhoods with older homes that were often 
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run down(Morrow, 1997a). The Black community made up 20% of the total Dade county 
population, but was divided between Caribbean and African-American, making it harder for 
them to act collectively as a cohesive group, so many of their interests were not systematically 
protected by local governments(Greiner & Morrow, 1997; Morrow, 1997a). The Dade County 
area affected by Hurricane Andrew had a mixed ethnic and racial background, contributing to a 
unique gradient of social vulnerability among minority citizens(Greiner & Morrow, 1997). While 
minority status is generally accepted as positively correlated with vulnerability, the capital that 
the Hispanic community of Dade County had attained before Hurricane Andrew allowed them 
to protect their interests at the expense of the Black community. There was a longstanding 
history of competition for resources between these two minority communities, and impacts of 
Andrew only served to perpetuate this competition.  
Preparation 
 
         Because the storm increased in intensity rather quickly, individuals had little time to 
prepare appropriately. In many cases, the costs of properly closing up one’s home and 
evacuating caused people to stay home and to wait out the storm. Emergency managers and 
government officials believed that televised hurricane warnings provided enough information 
to properly prepare for the storm and advise residents of proper courses of action (Gladwin & 
Peacock, 1997). Many prepared for the storm by fulfilling basic needs, with a survey by Gladwin 
and Peacock indicating that over 90% of the sample population had lighting(flashlights, candles, 
etc), water, and radios and non-perishable foods(Gladwin & Peacock, 1997). Beyond acquiring 
basic supplies, the decision to evacuate is of fundamental importance to individuals in coping 
with a storm. Patterns of evacuation indicate that families with young children, social networks 
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urging them to leave, and high incomes tended to leave while ethnic minorities were less likely 
to evacuate. In fact, due to a myriad of factors, Blacks were measured as being two-thirds less 
likely to evacuate than Anglos (Gladwin & Peacock, 1997). While preparation for and response 
to storm warnings is important to the protection of human life, there are many social factors 
that can inform a person’s decision to leave that fall outside logical processes. Access to 
resources and personal experience tend to have a large impact upon a person’s decision to act 
upon storm warnings and may inhibit recovery processes. 
The Storm 
 
         Andrew made landfall in an area that was nearly fifty percent minority community, with 
South Dade being hardest hit. Blacks suffered more damage than Anglos or Hispanics as they 
tended to be concentrated in older communities (Morrow, 1997a). Government response to 
the storm was problematic because of the bureaucratic system in which decisions were being 
made, or not being made. Most elected government officials whose job scope included 
emergency management had never been called to act upon those duties, and the novice of 
many leaders concurrently did little to help the situation. These leaders represented small 
communities, which led them to be acting in the self-interest of their communities(Averch & 
Dluhy, 1997). While government plans relied upon cooperation of leaders to make collective 
decisions, there were no actual plans in place to delineate how cooperation should take place. 
The reality of the stressful environment of the emergency command center, along with 
inexperience of leaders led to the failure of the initial disaster response. According to Averch 
and Dluhy, this resource distribution was highly related to political power, officials turned to a 
barter system in which some leaders could better act in the interest of their constituency. 
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Those with greater political power and capital representatives of the affluent or Anglo 
communities as well as the stronger minorities. For example, the largely Anglo city of 
Homestead hired a media relations team for a fee of $75,000 out of city budget which paid off 
in the amount of aid they received as a result of their publicity(Averch & Dluhy, 1997). As a 
result of this government failure to properly respond to the storm, certain areas of the affected 
county received more resources than others. In this case, those whose interests were protected 
were the more affluent and the Anglos while minority and low-income communities received 
inadequate resources.  
Scholars who study disasters and recovery efforts agree that the quicker a community is 
able to respond and begin to rebuild, the less time it takes to recover, so groups that were 
already less vulnerable were on the fast track to recovery while vulnerable groups were not 
protected. The system of non-cooperation created within the local government through direct 
response to the storm also created a poor tone for recovery efforts (Averch & Dluhy, 1997). 
Dade County was unequipped to handle a disaster of this magnitude, and the efforts of 
government leaders to respond to the storm highlight the lack of attention paid to low-income 
and minority communities by local government.  
Recovery 
 
 Recovery efforts usually begin immediately after a storm and can encompass everything 
from first response to long term revitalization projects. In recovering from a disaster, people 
tend to rely on personal resources, informal kinship, and government resources in that order 
(Morrow, 1997b). In Dade County, over 160,000 people were left homeless immediately 
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following the storm and 86,000 jobs were lost(Mileti, 1999). Citizens faced a struggle to return 
home, find jobs, and resume normal functions with varying degrees of difficulty. 
Returning “Home”: Tent Cities 
         Returning home for most residents was a long process, but most difficult for low income 
and people of color. Of the 130,000 households made homeless by Hurricane Andrew, three 
quarters of households were families and half of these families were minority status(mostly 
Hispanic and Black). This means that around 50,000 minority families were displaced and made 
homeless as a result of the storm (Morrow, 1997b).  
As a direct response to this homeless crisis, the federal government set up a handful of 
“tent cities” which were campgrounds set up on public lands and run by the military. These 
campgrounds were military issue tents set up on wooden platforms, hosting cots for about 
twenty residents each. Showers and toilets were placed far away from living quarters, and were 
a communal affair. Meals were served by the military, and the bulk of a resident’s day was 
spent waiting in line for facilities, food, or aid. These encampments were not exactly a pleasant 
place to live, as there was no privacy, no escape from the heat, and little freedom afforded to 
residents(Yelvington, 1997). As predicted by disaster literature, existing social inequalities 
between races also escalated in this time period as many were forced to compete for limited 
resources. Within the tent cities, Anglos and Blacks believed that Hispanic political power led 
them to an imbalance in treatment(Yelvington, 1997).  
  Initially, the camps were underutilized, but in the aftermath of the storm officials 
began to condemn many homes that remained occupied by owners or residents. In a survey 
conducted by Morrow and her colleagues, around 20% of Dade County respondents reported 
that they were forced to move out of their homes. As a result, the tent cities soon became 
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overrun with low-income and minority groups who had no other resources to turn to. Almost 
forty percent of Tent City dwellers had family who were also living in these camps, indicating a 
level of the resource network available to the average resident (Morrow, 1997b). In addition, 
the city hosted a large proportion of undocumented workers, and other minorities who were 
conditioned to mistrust the government and needed assurance their needs would be met. With 
no one to turn to but the government, tent cities became the only viable housing option for 
low-income and minority individuals as they did not have social or economic capital for other 
options.  
Many people were forced to leave home and recovery efforts to move into tent cities a 
month after the storm because they believed they would be preferentially treated for FEMA 
assistance. While this was not intended to be true, FEMA began allocating relief trailers to tent 
city dwellers in an attempt to close the temporary shelters. FEMA gradually accepted more 
responsibility for these dwellings, taking over admissions and other basic functions from 
volunteers. FEMA began to tighten the reigns on residents, noticeably so with admission to the 
camp, they began to restrict admission by requiring documented proof of residence and 
identification. These procedures worked to keep out those in need of services such as low-
income who had been subletting or living with multiple families and undocumented 
immigrants. The operation and functioning of these temporary structures exemplified the 
maintenance of the status quo of inequality (Yelvington, 1997). Systems of these camps keep 
the most vulnerable from returning to normal functions, further delaying the recovery process 
of themselves and their communities.  
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In a rush to close these cities which existed outside their intended parameters, FEMA 
knowingly left over 2,000 people homeless but claimed since this was lower than the pre-
Andrew rate of homelessness this action was justified. This is just another example of ways in 
which an attempt to return to the status quo pushes vulnerable populations away from view 
when disasters offer an opportunity to make positive changes.  
Rebuilding for Some 
 
The plight of the low-income homeowner in the case of recovery from Andrew went 
unnoticed because of their attempt to be self-sufficient. They were more likely to be living in 
condemned housing and less likely to receive aid from FEMA or other government sources 
because they were not deemed as needy as residents of tent cities. In addition, low-income 
homeowners, as opposed to higher-income homeowners, were more likely to have 
“temporary” residents living with them for greater than four months as opposed to higher-
income homes (Morrow, 1997b). Low-income homeowners are among the many who 
systematically receive inadequate compensation from insurance, as they are less likely to be 
insured by major corporations and/or have the knowledge to navigate the system of insurance 
companies(Peacock & Girard, 1997).  
In addition to single and multi-unit homes, mobile homes were a popular feature of the 
Dade County area. Because these homes were relatively inexpensive, but offered a degree of 
privacy and above all the American Dream of homeownership they were a desirable housing 
unit(Wisner et al., 2004). However, these units were low-value and overwhelmingly destroyed 
by the storm, with total losses estimated at 9,000 mobile home units(Mileti, 1999). Residents 
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faced many barriers in rebuilding as insurance payouts, if available at all, were below necessary 
costs to replace the units (Peacock & Girard, 1997).   
Along with mobile home owners, renters suffered greatly from impacts of the storm for 
many reasons. Primarily because federal funding, and insurance tends to be concerned with the 
homeowner rather than the dweller. In the case of Andrew, renters tended to be low-income or 
middle-income individuals and usually have little say in how the land owner chooses to rebuild 
from a storm. Demographic patterns of relocation after Andrew showed middle class and white 
renters moving out of highly damaged areas concurrent with an increase in low-income 
renters(V. K. Smith et al., 2006). These trends can explain some of the increasing segregation 
post Andrew as the hardest hit and most damaged areas had large influx of low-income and 
Black populations. These trends also reiterate the idea that wealth denotes mobility as the 
middle class was able to collect their money and rebuild elsewhere, avoiding a sluggish 
recovery process in an effort to return to normal.  
         FEMA guidelines for receiving money were also difficult for low-income and people of 
color to navigate because guidelines were based largely upon the model of the middle-class 
nuclear family. These guidelines did little to address the unique cultural habitation patterns of 
the area. In processing funding applications, FEMA regarded the “head of household” and 
rightful applicant to be the first individual to file for help. They categorized all additional 
applications for the same address as fraudulent, which led to barriers for many living in 
crowded housing conditions in receiving appropriate funding. In addition, because of FEMA’s 
strict guidelines the poor had the hardest time receiving aid because it took a great deal of 
time, energy, and skill to receive assistance. Thus, people who needed the most were unable to 
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receive assistance because of structural bias against the poor, culturally diverse region hit by 
Hurricane Andrew (Morrow, 1997b). The increasing heterogeneity of American households 
should have been addressed in government aid available to survivors of hurricane Andrew as it 
encompasses largely minority populations among other socially vulnerable groups. The reality 
of the bureaucratic process of Andrew recovery went put vulnerable populations farther away 
from recovery as they could not receive money because they did not fit the middle-class all 
American mold standards of the government(Peacock & Ragsdale, 1997). 
         Among the housing lost in the storm, close to 20,000 units both state and federally 
funded was destroyed. These units were subsidized rent and public housing leaving some of the 
storms poorest survivors out of luck (Morrow, 1997a). One government official went so far as 
to state that the housing market would “sort itself out”, indicating in no uncertain terms the 
dependence of the federal government upon private markets(Peacock & Girard, 1997). This 
statement speaks clearly to the reality that dependent citizens cannot place faith in the 
government to have the desire to care for them. 
The reluctance of government to rebuild or fix up this low-income housing led to 
inability of many who had been reliant on this housing to find new places to live. Residents 
were effectively forced to remain in homes that should have been condemned because they 
had no other options. Remaining rental properties could charge more for rent and be more 
selective as to their renters. In an effort to remedy the closing of these housing units, the 
government issued rent vouchers however these proved to be a poor solution. Moving to 
available housing units would have meant uprooting their lives, which many recipients did not 
want to do. Others who received these vouchers did not end up receiving them because of 
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bureaucratic processes involving the issuing of the checks. At one point, FEMA realized they had 
made a mistake in processing and actually tried to collect already distributed aid checks, which 
recipients had already spent (Morrow, 1997b). 
Evidence of uneven recovery can also be observed in resulting racial makeup of Dade 
County. South Dade in particular saw a great deal of storm damage, with 90% of Blacks in the 
area living in the most damaged homes (Girard & Peacock, 1997). In this damaged area of South 
Dade, the Black population actually increased following the storm while Anglo and Hispanic 
flight was observed(V. K. Smith et al., 2006).  General trends of the storm found that areas in 
which uninhabitable damaged homes existed at a rate of over fifty percent actually grew in 
population. Of these areas, it was found that low-income renters were moving in while White 
and middle-class renters were moving out(V. K. Smith et al., 2006). In areas most damaged by 
the storm this process created distinct racial segregation where previously there had been little 
to none. The segregation that resulted from resource availability in recovery led those with 
decent insurance payouts to move to more desirable location, accelerating pre-impact trends of 
poor Black communities within Dade County.  
Homestead versus Florida City 
 
 The path of destruction that Andrew wrought left two cities, Homestead and Florida 
City, in almost identical states of damage but the story of their recovery serves to highlight 
realities of social vulnerability. Although the entire case study of Hurricane Andrew explains 
matters of social vulnerability, these two cities offer an important lens through which to 
compare more direct impacts. Because they experienced the same storm surge, but responded 
and recovered differently we can more directly observe the impact that political power, 
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economics, and race play on an area. Florida City was a black community, 60% black, on the 
edge of poverty with a larger renter population, over 50%. The economy of the town was 
dependent upon agriculture as its main industry, and had a small local government which was 
not equipped to handle race and class needs of the area. In addition,  (Dash, Peacock, & 
Morrow, 1997; Morrow, 1997a). Homestead was a middle class Anglo community with a 20% 
greater income and home value than Florida City. In addition, it had a larger and more diverse 
economy, allowing it to rebound much faster(Dash et al., 1997; Morrow, 1997a).  As noted 
above, Homestead’s city budget allowed them to respond to the storm and the confusion 
surrounding disaster management. Through the PR team the city was able to increase its 
exposure and external donations, and become a priority for government aid. This led to a net 
gain in resources for the city(Averch & Dluhy, 1997). 
 In the long-term recovery process, Florida City lost 80% of its residential buildings as 
compared to 60% in Homestead. Florida City also lost nearly 50% of its businesses, and while 
the city did campaign to revitalize the area through the addition of new business citizens 
protested. Citizens were opposed to this change were concerned because the new business 
plan was overshadowing any talks of rebuilding of housing. Florida City residents were seen to 
have low application rates for federal funding, which can be explained by the idea that there 
was mistrust of Federal government. Overall, Florida City saw greater rates of Anglo and 
Hispanic flight and increased Black populations in addition to a decreasing economic industry. 
Pre-storm racial segregation and disparities in home values carried through impacts of the 
storm to highlight that idea that disasters serve to exacerbate pre-impact trends. This change in 
area composition extends beyond the Florida City divide to create long-term consequences of 
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increased inequality and heightened segregation(Dash et al., 1997). A direct comparison of the 
two cities allows for a more concrete example of how race and socioeconomic status affect 
recovery processes and resources available to a community.  
It Could Have Been Worse 
 
 While this story depicts a harsh story of surviving and recovering from a major natural 
disaster as well as $25 billion worth of damage, Andrew was not the worst case scenario. 
Landfall in South Dade affected many, but if the path of the storm had veered toward North 
Dade there would have been greater impact to Black and Hispanic groups as well as renters and 
the poor because North Dade had larger proportions of each(S. K. Smith & McCarty, 1996). And 
if the storm had hit the major metropolitan city of Miami, just 20 miles off course, it would have 
done unimaginable damage.  
 The story of Hurricane Andrew explains how those solely reliant upon government 
assistance in a disaster are disproportionality burdened with recovery efforts as they attempt 
to rebuild from disaster. Beginning with lack of government agency, continuing on to live in tent 
cities, and moving back into damaged homes, the low-income residents were barred from 
attempts at recovery as they lacked both economic resources and social support to rebuild and 
return to some state of normalcy. The failure of government support was both a perpetuation 
of existing systems, which failed to address needs of the most vulnerable, and an elucidation of 
capacity low-income and minority citizens have to address shocks to the normal lives. These 
demographic, social, and economic components of vulnerability lead to inequalities in recovery 
processes as individuals who start with less before a storm have more to lose. The case of 
Hurricane Andrew exemplifies disaster frameworks that indicate pre-impact trends are 
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accelerated in recovery efforts, as low-income and minority populations became more poor 
and segregated as a result of the storm. Through analysis of the storm, lessons can be taken in 
understanding that there is currently little priority of attending to needs of low-income and 
minority communities even though they are the ones that face the greatest impacts of storms. 
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Chapter 4: Hurricane Katrina 
 
         Hurricane Katrina is probably the most infamous hurricane of the past fifty years 
because of the level of destruction it caused. Most people, at least within the United States, are 
aware of some level of mismanagement on the part of government authorities that shaped the 
event not just as a tragedy, but also as an injustice to many Americans. Van Heerden, a disaster 
science researcher and part of the team that addressed assessment of the storm reminds us of 
the realities of vulnerability stating, “Hurricane Katrina was both a natural disaster and a 
systematic failure on the part of our society” (van Heerden & Bryan, 2006, p. 4). There is ample 
of literature related to race and environmental justice that examines what went wrong in both 
preparation and recovery phases that explains how much of New Orleans is still struggling 
nearly a decade later. Katrina will serve as an important case study for hurricanes and 
vulnerable populations because the storm made landfall in a physically and socially vulnerable 
area, and its story explains the realities of how a vulnerable population must deal with such an 
event. 
A Pre-Existing Condition 
 
         Historically, the city of New Orleans has faced social inequality from its beginnings as a 
slave post. The city also had a number of free blacks, which grew substantially after the 
American Civil War. While these individuals were free, they were largely poor and unemployed 
thus settled along back swamps, the levee walls (R. Bullard & Wright, 2009b; Khan, 2009). The 
city has a long history of pushing blacks to less desirable locations through segregation and 
economic policies. Several urban development measures of the 1900s led to a suburbanization 
for white residents and urbanization for blacks (R. Bullard & Wright, 2009b; Dyson, 2006; Khan, 
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2009). Between 1970 and 2000, although poverty only increased by three percent, the number 
of neighborhoods with concentrated poverty increased by nearly two-thirds (Khan, 2009). The 
city of New Orleans had a twenty-three percent poverty rate as compared to a national average 
of twelve percent (Dash, 2013). As a result of this history, about thirty percent of blacks lived in 
poverty compared to only ten percent of whites in 2000. In addition to these staggering poverty 
statistics, it is important to note that more than forty percent of these poor blacks lived in poor 
neighborhoods (Dyson, 2006; Squires & Hartman, 2006). This stark contrast between available 
land to blacks, and particularly low-income blacks, is an important reminder that vulnerability is 
not random, but historically guided. Hurricane Katrina simply realized the potential for 
environmental injustice that had been brewing in the city for decades. 
         Not only did New Orleans have an overwhelming amount of blacks living in poverty, 
these areas were also in direct danger of known engineering problems. The levees, a man-made 
engineering fix, were designed to protect the city from floodwaters shaped property values of 
the city, leaving the poor with a kind of geographic vulnerability. The location of majority-black 
and low-income neighborhoods can be closely correlated with risk of levee failure partly 
because the land was initially more dangerous, and partially because levee repairs in these 
areas were few and far between (R. Bullard & Wright, 2009b). While it was an accepted fact at 
the time that the levees were not strong enough in all places to withstand a strong hurricane, 
funding was consistently cut from the Army Corps budget to maintain and upgrade them 
(Dyson, 2006). Adequately termed “levee roulette” even before the storm residents understood 
that the national government was not utilizing its available means to protect them (Sanyika, 
2009). This explains why 87% of flooding by volume in New Orleans was caused by levee 
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breeches (van Heerden & Bryan, 2006). Going into the storm, it was clear that the government 
could not protect citizens to the extent it should.  
Preparation for the Storm 
 
         Often addressed in the literature, information availability and perceived risk are one 
large component of response to pre-storm measures. Survivors interviewed at the Superdome, 
one of the largest temporary shelters set up, indicated a number of distinct contextual reasons 
they had not, or could not evacuate. Among the most common was family ties, having 
immobile family members that they had to take care of, or lack of money to leave (Eisenman, 
Cordasco, Asch, Golden, & Glik, 2007). In more rural areas, information dissemination was a key 
issue as many people lived a great distance apart and did not receive proper updates about the 
storm. Resources available to the urban residents were not afforded to rural dwellers as 
resources are often a great distance from where people live (Bassett, 2009). 
The issue with transportation for leaving the city was also a factor of economic means 
because many poor, especially in New Orleans, relied heavily on public transportation to move 
around within the city. In urban areas, more than half of primary transit users are people of 
color, and African Americans are almost four times less likely to have access to a car (R. D. 
Bullard, Johnson, & Torres, 2009). So low-income people of color did not have access to a 
vehicle, or a large enough vehicle for extended family, in order to protect themselves by 
leaving. Although New Orleans was one of the few cities that had accounted for this population, 
in the face of the storm leaders never activated the evacuation plan, leaving residents to fend 
for themselves (Scandlyn et al., 2013). All other disaster evacuation plans, including the 
mandatory evacuation order issued by New Orleans mayor Nagin, to residents operate under 
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the assumption that residents have access to private transportation (R. D. Bullard et al., 2009; 
Dyson, 2006). Although the government was aware of the reliance of a large portion of their 
vulnerable population on public transportation, “emergency transportation planners failed the 
most vulnerable of our society” (R. D. Bullard et al., 2009, p. 72).  
 In addition to lack of financial means to protect themselves, residents of New Orleans-
especially the elderly- have a long history of enduring hurricanes (R. D. Bullard & Wright, 2012). 
As a result of locational vulnerability, some felt better prepared to wait out the storm rather 
than rely on limited government assistance in providing storm shelters or burden themselves by 
planning for evacuation (Eisenman et al., 2007). 
         A pre-existing condition of social vulnerability set the stage for difficulties poor residents 
had leaving the city, as well as their ability to process and react to information regarding the 
storm. Many decided to stay because they had always weathered the storm, but many more 
had no feasible way to leave the city and protect themselves simultaneously (Dyson, 2006). So, 
when the storm hit and the levees broke, the majority of stranded populations were low-
income blacks waiting for government rescue that often came too little and too late. 
A Second Disaster 
 
In looking at recovery efforts of the city, it is clear that what little is being done to 
address these issues of vulnerability is not enough. While around twenty percent of whites 
permanently relocated after the storm, almost half of blacks relocated (R. Bullard & Wright, 
2009b). Permanent relocation after Katrina can largely be tied to inability to return to, or 
become successful in the new city. This phenomenon can be closely correlated with pre-storm 
vulnerability as people have a harder time participating in recovery efforts if they have been 
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devastated themselves (R. Bullard & Wright, 2009b). Already vulnerable populations were 
either forced to start from scratch in a new city, or start from scratch in a place they had always 
called home. Almost more disturbing, is that while the city population decreased by almost a 
third following Katrina, the percent of vulnerable individuals in the Gulf Coast increased 1.5 fold 
(Khan, 2009). Along these lines, the government’s efforts to reinforce dangerous levees can be 
seen to closely correspond with pre-existing protection of high lying, economically desirable, 
white land (R. Bullard & Wright, 2009b). 
 Renter Vulnerability and Housing 
 
         Another way that we can measure economic relations to vulnerability is through an 
understanding of home ownership, or lack thereof. Home ownership is a form of capital, and is 
a socially desirable notion because it represents for many the American Dream (Bassett, 2009). 
It is for this reason that, especially in rural areas, low-income families are often forced into old 
and poorly constructed housing or more affordable mobile homes. These are the conditions 
that many residents of Katrina’s path found themselves in during and after the storm. In rural 
areas of Louisiana, uninsured or underinsured low-income populations had limited resources 
for their homes to weather the storm, and a nearly impossible time fighting with insurance for 
money to rebuild (Bassett, 2009). In New Orleans, there were many renters, with the low-
income majority black populations especially, living in government housing or reliant on 
government assistance for rent. Almost a year after the storm, eighty percent of public housing 
had still not been reopened leaving its needy former residents without a way to go home(R. 
Bullard & Wright, 2009b). The government made decisions with respect to public housing that 
were not necessarily in the best interest of the housing poor market. They chose to 
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permanently close several of the complexes, and rebuilt some as mixed-income developments 
providing less housing for their previous tenants, and opening the city up to gentrification 
efforts in line with the increasingly white population (R. Bullard & Wright, 2009b). 
 In a survey conducted by the National Fair Housing Alliance (NFHA), the only national 
civil rights organization with a focus on housing discrimination, there was an observed bias in 
housing opportunities. They conducted a survey of rental housing across five states, those hit 
by Katrina and areas where survivors were concentrated in relocating. Through this survey, they 
conducted both caller survey and follow up in-person surveys at locations they observed 
discrimination against African-American survivors. These acts of discrimination included but 
were not limited to: differential treatment of applicants, failure to disclose available units, 
offering of discounts to White callers, and misquoting of prices. While the sample size for this 
study was relatively small, these represent illegal acts of discrimination in the states of 
Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Tennessee, and Texas. FEMA as well as the department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD) did not respond to the report submitted by NFAH, and failed to 
take independent action to research this issue. Considering that there were close to 125,000 
families living in hotels funded by FEMA in addition to uncounted individuals staying with 
friends and family at the time of this study, any level of housing discrimination at the time 
should have proved a notable encounter in vulnerability studies(National Fair Housing Alliance, 
2005). 
         Temporary housing for those rebuilding was given in terms of trailers, which were later 
found to be toxic with asbestos. Since nearly half of the housing units destroyed by Katrina 
were rentals, many people had no say over the fate of their homes. Because of the great deal of 
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destroyed unit, rent increased so dramatically that many residents were unable to return to the 
city, and those on housing vouchers from the government saw an increase by nearly one third 
in the value to compensate for this increase (Khan, 2009). 
         In addition to home ownership, insurance is a large component of recovery capital that 
systematically favors whites and middle or upper class. Recovery of private homes becomes a 
function of the owners’ access to resources, including insurance and personal wealth utilized to 
rebuild (Bates & Green, 2009). Recovery options were limited to private insurance, loans from 
the Small Business Association, or grant money from the Road Home Program (Adams, Van 
Hattum, & English, 2009). The first two programs were limited to those with pre-existing wealth 
for insurance or credit for loans. The uninsured rate is almost 1.5 times greater for blacks than 
whites, and it is understood that blacks usually have worse coverage than others (R. Bullard & 
Wright, 2009a). The Road Home program was such a bureaucratic nightmare that it was 
eventually sued for improper resource distribution because black homeowners were 
systematically denied proper payments for their homes as compared to whites (Dash, 2013). 
Pre-storm housing values were used for many insurance payouts, leaving some with less money 
that adequate rebuilding process would cost (Bates & Green, 2009). Even those with insurance 
had little success receiving settlements as their policies were worse, and they had no resources 
or capacity to fight insurance companies for fair payouts. Many with lower value homes in black 
areas faced issues of redlining of neighborhoods and had to be insured through smaller 
companies which were lower quality with less resources than bigger names. Another issue 
specific to Katrina was storm damage as a result of flooding, which is not offered through 
insurance agencies but through a government program. Although it is considered mandatory, 
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many low-income individuals simply could not afford it and had let their coverage lapse and 
many older homes were not required to have it because they were grandfathered into previous 
policies (Bates & Green, 2009).  
         The amount of time spent in transition can greatly affect recovery, as the goal is always 
to return to “normal”. Low-income people of color spend more time in temporary housing and 
shelters as compared to their middle-class and white counterparts. In addition, these 
population are more likely to remain permanently displaced as a result of the storm which 
accounts for the large decrease in blacks after the storm (R. Bullard & Wright, 2009b). Housing 
and rebuilding in New Orleans after the storm serve to explain some injustices to vulnerable 
populations in recovery to storms.  
 Finding Work 
 
         Another element that caused undue difficulty in residents returning home and assisting 
in the rebuilding efforts of their own city was the outsourcing of labor. While it is both socially 
and economically beneficial to hire storms survivors to fix their city, in the case of New Orleans 
migrant and immigrant workers composed the majority of construction workers. These 
temporary workers could be ready to work almost immediately as they were not struggling to 
recoup losses of the storm(Khan, 2009; Whelan & Strong, 2009). These low-skill construction 
jobs available to residents after the storm also did not cater to the elderly, women, or 
transportation-less survivors who were unable to fill these positions. So, in the face of recovery 
low-income storm survivors were barred from recovery in a catch-22 because they could not 
get the jobs to provide resources and they did not have basic resources to get jobs. In stark 
contrast to these low-skilled laborers, affected more skilled workers often chose to stay out of 
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New Orleans, relying on social networks and skill level to find employment in other cities. The 
exodus of the black middle-class can be largely explained by this phenomenon (Whelan & 
Strong, 2009).  
Takeaway 
 
The government failed vulnerable populations in New Orleans and beyond as a direct 
result of Katrina by improperly protecting levees designed to keep storms out, reacting to the 
disaster far too late, and removing longstanding support for living affordability to low-income 
residents. One returned resident likened recovery efforts to a “hamster wheel” because all the 
effort being put into recovery was going nowhere (Adams et al., 2009). A historically black city, 
rich in culture was stripped from many residents in a “black diaspora” following Katrina (R. 
Bullard & Wright, 2009a).  Citizens were removed from their homes to shelters were 
disproportionately black, and they faced numerous roadblocks in returning to New Orleans that 
kept many permanently out. The economics of recovery were a means of kicking out the poor 
and keeping them out of the city(Adams et al., 2009). In a raw analysis, Sanyaki stated that the 
“national lesson of Katrina is that African-American communities across the country are 
especially vulnerable to major disruptions in the political-economy because of persistent 
patterns of inequality and unequal access to life-sustaining resources”(Sanyika, 2009, p. 203).   
A climate of racial divide is still prevalent in post-Katrina New Orleans in line with 
unequal access to recovery resources and disparity of vulnerability. The climate of voting after 
the storm exemplifies this line as the platform rested on the political rights of the black 
population, and the black mayor was re-elected by blacks despite his previous white-majority 
support. Although he had no formal rebuilding platform, racial symbolism carried New Orleans 
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through the election exemplifying the black-white divide present within the city (Sanyika, 
2009).   
  Bullard and Wright summarize the post-Katrina climate by asserting that the 
“Government’s response to the impacts of Katrina on New Orleans and the Gulf Coast has 
challenged the beliefs of most Americans, black and white alike, that our government is 
competent to meet the challenges posed by most major disasters and, for African Americans 
particularly, that it will respond equally to the needs of all citizens, regardless of race or 
ethnicity” (R. D. Bullard & Wright, 2012, p. 42).  
In looking at the impacts of Hurricane Katrina, it is clear that low-income and minority 
communities lack the ability to respond to devastating effects of natural disasters in a similar 
manner to Whites and those of higher socioeconomic status. While government systems are 
theoretically designed to reduce the burden that these communities face, they failed the 
people of New Orleans and will continue to fail vulnerable communities if they do not adapt to 
the needs of the population they are responding to. The many delays in resuming normal 
function came from the government’s inability to provide resources it had before the storm, 
such as public housing and transportation, trapping those reliant on these services in a 
purgatory of reconstruction. Underlying causes of this reliance on the government are 
embedded with the social framework of the United States, which dictates the access individuals 
have to certain levels of resources. Recovery in largely black areas of New Orleans is ongoing, 
and represents failures of government and private enterprise to address the needs of many 
people. The story of Katrina reiterates the fundamental understanding that disasters serve to 
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accelerate pre-impact trends, leaving low-income and minority individuals further economically 
and socially segregated from Whites and those of higher socioeconomic status.   
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Chapter 5: Predicting Vulnerability  
 
 Given the understanding of changes to hurricane patterns, we can assume a greater 
level of damage to coastal communities in future events. This taken in conjunction with an 
understanding of how minority and low-income individuals are disproportionately burdened 
with preparation from, response to, and recovery from storm events as evidenced by case 
studies of Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina is cause for concern. Therefore, it is important to 
identify communities with characteristics that will put individuals at greater risk of damage as a 
result of these storms. This work will add to the great body of literature focused on mapping 
vulnerability (Cutter, 2009; Cutter et al., 2003; Prasad, 2012). 
Methods 
 
 Data was taken from the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey(ACS) 2008-
2012 5-year estimate( U.S. Census Bureau). The 5-year estimate was chosen because it provides 
data for all census tracts, and is the most reliable data because it draws from the largest sample 
size. The ACS is annually collected data, which replaced the long-form census questionnaire 
after the 2000 census(US Census Bureau, 2013). It is important to note that this is a sample, not 
a comprehensive count. Data was taken from the following datasets: Race, Hispanic or Latino 
Origin, and Poverty Status of Families in the Past 12 Months by Household Type by number of 
Persons in Family.  
 Data provided by the Census Bureau was in the form of a count, so the author 
calculated makeup of county populations as percentages. The state of Louisiana uses the term 
parish in lieu of county. The author then calculated state averages for population makeup. 
Population makeup was then compared through generation of a bucket variable, which 
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identified counties above the state average. Bucket groups were created in 5% intervals for 
poverty and Hispanic data points and 10% intervals for Black population data points. This 
differentiation was created because the variance observed for Black communities was greater 
than that for the other variables.   
 
                     Figure 1. Map of United States with Gulf Coast states highlighted in red. 
 The study was conducted over the United States Gulf Coast states of Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida. Although Texas is part of the Gulf Coast, it was excluded from 
this study. Also highlighted were coastal communities, as defined by NOAA. NOAA developed 
this list of coastal counties by defining coastal as having 15% or more of their total land area in 
coastal watershed, or at least 15% of coastal cataloguing unit’s land area(National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration, 2012). Of these counties, there are 9 in Alabama,62 in Florida, 38 
in Louisiana, and 12 in Mississippi.  
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Table 1. Variables measuring human vulnerability. Adapted from Prasad 2012. 
Category Indicator Variable Effect on 
Vulnerability 
Demographic Race % population Black (+) 
 Ethnicity % population Hispanic or 
Latino 
(+) 
Economic Poverty % households below poverty (+) 
 
 Variables chosen of race, ethnicity, and poverty utilized as proxies for minority and low-
income status (Table 1). Based upon analysis of events in the case study chapters, these are 
important indicators of vulnerability status. It can therefore be assumed that the presence of a 
population within these categories should be noted for concern.  
Results and Discussion  
 
Figure 2. Census parishes in the state of Louisiana with Black populations greater than 
the state average. 
  
Disasters Are Not, They Become 49 
In the state of Louisiana, 28 out of 64 parishes have Black populations above the state 
average. Of these counties, twelve lie within the coastal parishes as defined by NOAA(Figure 2). 
While there were relatively few counties falling outside the average Black population within 
Mississippi, with the calculated average of 32%, this falls dramatically above the a national 
average of 13% (US Census Bureau, 2015).  
 
 
Figure 3. Census parishes in the state of Louisiana with Hispanic populations greater  
than the state average. 
 
Louisiana shows 11 out of 64 parishes as having greater than a state average of Hispanic 
populations, with 10 of which being coastal communities (Figure 3). The majority of these 
appear to be concentrated in the New Orleans area which is reason for concern as the city is 
still not prepared for a major storm.  
Disasters Are Not, They Become 50 
 
Figure 4. Census parishes in the state of Louisiana with percent of families in poverty  
greater than the state average. 
 There are 37 out of 64 parishes with families in poverty greater than the state average, 
17 of which fall in coastal parishes (Figure 4). There is no apparent concentration of families in 
poverty. The state of Louisiana as a whole saw 13 parishes that fell in both Black and poverty 
indicators, 8 with Hispanic and poor, and 2 parishes that fell into all three categories. It likely 
that the correlation between Black and poverty indicators are interrelated, and such instances 
of this overlap add to our key understanding of vulnerability. 
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 Figure 5. Census counties in the state of Mississippi with Black populations greater than 
the state average. 
 
Mississippi has 42 out of the 83 counties as being greater than the state average for 
black populations. Of these Black counties, four fall within the coastal barriers as identified by 
NOAA (Figure 5). It can be observed by this figure that the majority of Black populations are 
concentrated along the western border of the state and is relatively aggregated in areas of 
higher concentration. This concentration of Black populations is concerning in highlighting 
vulnerability as presented literature in addition to both case studies indicate Black communities 
face impacts of social vulnerability at greater rates within the United States.  
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Figure 6. Census counties in the state of Mississippi with Hispanic populations 
 greater than the state average. 
  
 In the state of Mississippi, 21 out of the 82 counties saw Hispanic populations greater 
than the state average, 4 of which fall within coastal communities (Figure 6). There is no 
apparent trend of aggregation of Hispanic communities throughout the state.  
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Figure 7. Census counties in the state of Mississippi with percent of families in poverty  
greater than the state average. 
 
In the state of Mississippi, 55 out of the 82 counties fell above the state average for 
percent of families in poverty, 5 of which were within coastal counties (Figure 7). There appears 
to be a concentration of higher numbers of families in poverty along the western border of the 
state. Within the observed positive indicators of poverty, race, and ethnicity 42 counties in the 
state of Mississippi have some overlap. There were 30 counties with some level above average 
of both Black populations and families in poverty, 2 with Hispanic and Black populations above 
average, 2 with Hispanic and families and poverty, and 10 counties that had all three measured 
components. Once again, the aggregation of Black individuals and families and poverty 
correlates levels of social vulnerability.  
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Figure 8.  Census counties in the state of Alabama with Black populations 
 greater than the state average. 
 
In the state of Alabama, 29 out of the 67 counties saw Black populations greater than 
the state average. Of these counties, 5 fall within the NOAA coastal area (Figure 8). The 
concentration of these Black population appears to aggregate in the South West corner of the 
state.  
 
Figure 9. Census counties in the state of Alabama with Hispanic populations greater  
than the state average. 
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In the state of Alabama, 17 out of the 67 counties saw concentrations of Hispanic 
populations higher than the state average, with 2 counties in coastal region(Figure 9). There is 
no apparent geographic trend to explain distribution patterns. It is also important to note that 
no counties fall more than 15% above the state average for Hispanic populations and therefore 
it is not likely that Hispanic populations are concentrated enough to face certain levels of 
vulnerability in storms.  
 
Figure 10. Census counties in the state of Alabama with percent of families in poverty  
greater than the state average. 
  
 There were 45 out of 67 total counties in the state of Alabama that have greater than 
average number of families in poverty, 8 of which lie in coastal communities ( Figure 10). It is 
interesting to note that the majority of coastal communities show some degree of correlation 
with poverty. Overall the state had 22 counties that fell into categories of high Black and 
poverty concentrations, 5 that fell into categories of Hispanic and poverty concentrations, and 4 
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counties that expressed degrees of all three indicators of vulnerability. There appears to be a 
high correlation between counties that fall into both high concentrations of Blacks and families 
in poverty along the coastal region of the state. This is of particular concern because it may 
indicate a compounding of locational and social vulnerability that would drastically effect these 
populations if a storm event were to occur.  
 
 
Figure 11, Census counties in the state of Florida with Black populations greater than  
the state average. 
 
In the state of Florida, 24 out of 67 had Black communities greater than the average. 
Since most of the state falls within coastal boundaries, all but two of these counties are coastal 
(Figure 11). There appears to be a greater concentration of counties with higher proportions of 
Black populations on the panhandle.  
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Figure 12. Census counties in the state of Florida with Hispanic populations greater  
than the state average. 
  
 There were 9 out of 67 counties in Florida with higher than average Hispanic 
populations, all of which fall into coastal counties (Figure 12). The concentrations of Hispanic 
communities tend to be significantly above average which may indicate large pockets of 
Hispanic populations. In relation to previously mentioned Hurricane Andrew, it is clear that 
Miami Dade county has maintained a large Hispanic population that should be montiered for 
future vulnerabilities.   
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Figure 13. Census counties in the state of Louisiana with percent of families in poverty 
greater than the state average. 
 
There were 39 out of 67 counties in Florida with concentrations of families in poverty 
above the state average, of which 45 are coastal (Figure 13). There does not appear to be any 
patterns of concentration of poverty within the state. Within the state of Florida, 23 counties 
had overlapping characteristics of Black populations and families in poverty, 4 counties with 
large Hispanic populations and 3 counties saw all three variables. 
By far, the largest correlation between county vulnerability status from this data was 
Black and number of families in poverty. As explained by case studies, the connection between 
low-income and black communities is especially prohibitive to recovery processes due to 
limited social and economic capital generally associated with these two groups. Combining a 
historical analysis with current population trends, I would recommend study of these areas by 
emergency management agencies to identify needs of the community.   
The counties identified as having greater than average populations for any of the three 
proxy variables for vulnerability should be analyzed by scholars and policy makers for 
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adaptation and mitigation strategies to be undertaken to reduce vulnerability. The counties 
that has observed above average populations for all three variables should be studied as soon 
as possible to ascertain an understanding of their vulnerability and measures that can be taken 
to reduce that. Mapping projects such as this one should mark a first step for scholars and 
government officials to identify areas in which attention may be needed with respect to 
vulnerability status of a community. Of particular note, coastal communities within these states 
that see observed trends of these vulnerability proxies should be studied with a sense of 
urgency as they will likely see the greatest impacts as a result of climate change. 
Limitations 
 
 This study was limited in time and resources, and as such chosen variables represent a 
very small sample of indicators of vulnerability. Aggregation of this information in order to 
understand how these components interact with one another was also outside the scope of this 
research, therefore it is impossible to determine a comprehensive understanding of 
vulnerability based solely upon these results. In addition, statistical analysis was not completed 
on these variables to gain quantitative understanding of their significance.  
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Conclusions 
 
 Natural hazards are proven to pose extreme risks to social systems. Considering the 
impacts that global climate change is projected to have on hurricane activity, with an increasing 
number of intense storms being most likely in the near future it is important that we 
understand the risks of these storms to human settlements. Effects of sea level rise as a 
component of climate change, will increase damage of hurricanes to coastal settlements 
regardless of magnitude of the storm. In the United States, the effects of these changing 
hurricane patterns will be observed in the Gulf Coast, affecting the states of Alabama, Florida, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas.  
 In 1992, Hurricane Andrew devastated Dade County, leaving over 100,000 families 
homeless. In recovery efforts, the political system of resource distribution allowed represented 
Anglo and Hispanic communities to receive aid and rebuild infrastructure while low-income and 
black communities did not. These low-income and black individuals were pushed into makeshift 
housing, and returned to destroyed or nonexistent homes. Similarly, the devastation of 2005 
storm Hurricane Katrina inundated New Orleans leaving many outside the scope of personal or 
government resources to respond and recover. Patterns of response to a storm and recovery 
between the two cases show an elongated recovery time for low-income and minority 
communities. Difficulty preparing for, weathering a storm, and finding adequate housing and 
jobs after a storm push vulnerable populations beyond their abilities to respond. Government 
systems of recovery tend to inadequately address the needs of these populations. 
 In understanding this  
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Supplemental Material 
 
Table 2. Parishes in Louisiana with Black populations greater than state average. 
Up to 10% Above 
Average 
10-20% Above 
Average 
20-30% Above 
Average 
30-40% Above 
Average 
East Carroll Madison  Caddo  Bienville  
 Orleans  Claiborne  Concordia  
 St. Helena  East Baton Rouge  De Soto  
 St. John the Baptist  East Feliciana Franklin  
 Tensas  Iberville  Lincoln  
  Morehouse  Natchitoches 
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  St. James  Ouachita  
  West Feliciana  Pointe Coupee 
   Rapides Parish  
   Red River  
   Richland  
   St. Landry  
   Webster  
   West Baton Rouge 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Counties in Mississippi with Black populations greater than state average. 
Up to 10% 
Above Average 
10-20% 
Above 
Average 
20-30% 
Above 
Average 
30-40% 
Above 
Average 
40% or 
Greater 
Above 
Average 
Amite Copiah Adams Coahoma Claiborne 
Attala Jasper Bolivar Hinds Holmes  
Chickasaw Marshall Clay Humphreys Jefferson 
Grenada Panola Issaquena Leflore  
Lauderdale Pike Jefferson Noxubee  
Leake Tallahatchie Kemper Quitman  
Lowndes Winston  Sharkey  
Madison Yazoo  Sunflower  
Montgomery   Tunica  
Scott   Washington  
Walthall   Wilkinson  
Warren     
Wayne     
Yalobusha     
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Counties in Alabama with Black populations greater than state average. 
Up to 10 % 
Above Average 
10-20% Above 
Average 
20-30% Above 
Average 
30-40% Above 
Average 
40% or Greater 
Above Average 
Coosa Barbour Conecuh Hale Bullock 
Escambia Butler Marengo  Dallas 
Henry Chambers Montgomery  Greene 
Mobile Choctaw   Lowndes 
Talladega Clarke   Macon 
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Tallapoosa Jefferson   Perry 
Tuscaloosa Monroe   Sumter 
 Pickens   Wilcox 
 Pike    
 Russell    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Counties in Florida with Black population greater than state average.  
Up to 10% 
Above Average 
10-20% Above 
Average 
20-30% Above 
Average 
40% or Greater 
Above Average 
Aluacha Broward Jefferson Gadsden 
Bradford Duval Madison  
Calhoun Hamilton   
Columbia Jackson   
Escambia Leon   
Gulf    
Hillsborough    
Lafayette    
Liberty    
Miami-Dade    
Orange    
Palm    
Putnam    
St. Lucie    
Taylor    
Union    
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Parishes in Louisiana with Black populations greater  
than state average.  
Up to 5 % Above Average 5-10% Above Average 
Jefferson  Ascension  
St. Bernard  Bossier  
 Orleans  
 Plaquemines  
 St. Charles  
 St. John the Baptist  
 St. Mary  
Disasters Are Not, They Become 64 
 St. Tammany  
 Vernon  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Counties in Mississippi with Hispanic populations greater than state average. 
Up to 5% Above 
Average 
5-10% Above 
Average 
Adams  Hancock  
Amite Harrison 
Chickasaw   
Forrest   
George  
Jackson  
Lamar  
Leake  
Marion  
Marshall  
Pearl River  
Pike  
Scott  
Stone  
Tallahatchie  
Walthall  
Wilkinson  
Yazoo   
 
 
 
 
Table 8. Counties in Alabama with Hispanic population greater than state average. 
Up to 5% Above Average 5-10% Above Average  10-15% Above Average 
Baldwin DeKalb Franklin 
Barbour Marshall  
Blount   
Bullock   
Chilton   
Coffee   
Cullman   
Dale   
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Limestone   
Madison   
Morgan   
Russell   
Shelby   
St. Clair   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9. Counties in Florida with Hispanic population greater than state average. 
Up to 5% Above 
Average 
20% or Greater 
Above Average 
Broward Hardee 
Collier Hendry 
Hillsborough Miami-Dade 
Okeechobee Osceola 
Orange  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10. Parishes in Louisiana with number of families in poverty greater than state average. 
Up to 5% Above 
Average 
5-10% Above 
Average 
10-15% Above 
Average 
15-20% Above 
Average 
Jefferson St. Bernard Ascension  Acadia  
 Tensas  Assumption  Beauregard 
  Claiborne  Bienville  
  Concordia  Bossier  
  East Baton Rouge  Caddo  
  East Feliciana Calcasieu  
  Plaquemines  Cameron  
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  St. Helena  De Soto  
  Terrebonne  East Carroll  
  Vernon Iberville  
  Washington  Jefferson Davis  
   Lafayette  
   Lincoln  
   Livingston  
   Rapides  
   St. James  
   St. John the Baptist  
   St. Martin  
   St. Mary  
   St. Tammany  
   Webster  
   West Carroll  
   West Feliciana  
   Winn 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11. Counties in Mississippi with number of families in poverty greater than state average 
15-20% Above 
Average 
10-15 % Above 
Average 
5-10% Above 
Average 
Up to 5% Above 
Average 
Coahoma Bolivar Amite Adams 
Holmes Claiborne Attala Carroll 
Jefferson Humphreys Benton Clarke 
Leflore Noxubee Chickasaw Clay 
Quitman Sharkey Issaquena Copiah 
 Sunflower Montgomery Covington 
 Tallahatchie Tunica Forrest 
 Washington Wayne Franklin 
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 Yazoo  Grenada 
   Hinds 
   Jasper 
   Jefferson 
   Jones 
   Kemper 
   Lauderdale 
   Leake 
   Lincoln 
   Lowndes 
   Marion 
   Marshall 
   Neshoba 
   Oktibbeha 
   Panola 
   Pike 
   Prentiss 
   Smith 
   Tippah 
   Union 
   Walthall 
   Warren 
   Webster 
   Wilkinson 
   Winston 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12. Counties in Alabama with number of families in poverty greater than state average. 
Up to 5% Above 
Average 
5-10% Above 
Average 
10-15% Above 
Average 
15-20% Above 
Average 
Bullock Barbour Conecuh Dallas 
Calhoun Butler St. Clair Greene 
Cherokee Chambers  Sumter 
Chilton Clarke  Wilcox 
Clay Escambia   
Coosa Hale   
Covington Lowndes   
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Cullman Macon   
DeKalb Monroe   
Etowah Perry   
Fayette Pickens   
Franklin Russell   
Geneva Talladega   
Jackson    
Lamar    
Marengo    
Marion    
Marshall    
Mobile    
Montgomery    
Pike    
Randolph    
Tallapoosa    
Walker    
Washington    
Winston    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 13. Counties in Florida with number of families in poverty greater than state average. 
Up to 5% above 
Average 
5-10 % Above 
Average 
10-15% Above 
Average 
Baker Bradford Gadsden 
Columbia Calhoun Hardee 
Duval DeSoto Hendry 
Escambia Franklin  
Gulf Gilchrist  
Hamilton Glades  
Hernando Jefferson  
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Highlands Lafayette  
Hillsborough Levy  
Holmes Liberty  
Jackson Madison  
Leon Okeechobee  
Marion Putnam  
Miami-Dade Suwannee  
Orange   
Osceola   
Polk   
St. Lucie   
Taylor   
Union   
Walton   
Washington   
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